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DISCOVERING THE ARMY'S CORE COMPETENCIES

BY

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ABSTRACT

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This paper seeks to answer the question, "Has the Army correctly identified its core competencies to ensure the Army can adequately respond to the national military strategy?" FM 1, *The Army* (Prototype Draft), defines core competencies as "essential and enduring capabilities" that "define our fundamental contributions" to the national security. A better definition, based on the business origins of the term and vetted in the practical requirements of the military Services, is **unique, hard to replicate, and enduring attributes (not products) of the Services whose continued existence provides the source of strength, strategic focus and direction to their institutions.** Given this definition, two Army core competencies emerge. The first is institutional and the second operational. The Army has not correctly identified its core competencies to respond to the national military strategy. This paper proposed that the Army adopt and maintain the core competencies of developing **adaptive, mentally agile leaders and closing with and destroying the enemy.** The Army must continue to maintain these vital competencies if it is to adequately respond to the wide range of challenges and threats along the spectrum of conflict.

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DISCOVERING THE ARMY'S CORE COMPETENCIES

In pursuit of its roles in peace and war, the Armed Forces of United States development maintained **core military capabilities** that enable their success across the range of military operations. At the highest professional levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting **core competencies** that are the capstone to American military power (emphasis added).

—Joint Pub 1 (November 2000)

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the U.S. Army today is defining why it is transforming and ultimately, what the transformed Army will look like. The difficulty in determining a direction without a well-defined destination allows for the tried-and-true notion that if you do not know where you're going, then all roads lead "there" and you will never know when you arrived. What then is the beacon that illuminates a direction for the U.S. Army for the near future? Core competencies can serve as the foundation for a transformational process that must achieve and maintain momentum. We should use the Army core competencies to articulate the essential relevance of our Service to both our soldiers and our civilian leadership. If our core competencies serve to illuminate our direction through transformation, then we must ensure that we have accurately distilled the essence of our Service to match not only the national military requirements of today but well into the future.

This paper, then, seeks to answer the question, "Have we correctly identified our core competencies to ensure the Army can adequately respond to the national military strategy?" The question, though simple when posited, has various levels of complexity that we will address. First, we will sort out the definitional differences between Service Department roles, missions, functions, and core competencies. This will lead us to examine the business origins from which we can establish a working definition. Next, we will present the core competencies of each of the Services to identify possible points of friction. We will use the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive that enumerates Services functions as a point of departure for this comparison. Thirdly, we must tie the enduring Service competencies to the nature and conduct of warfare and address specifically what might cause these to change. Finally, we will propose a common definition of core competencies and recommend the enduring Army core competencies that will provide the thread of continuity that focuses our Army as it undergoes transformation in the 21st century.

DEFINITIONAL DISTINCTIONS

As Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) tells us, "the terms roles, missions, and functions are often used interchangeably, but the distinctions are important."¹ Roles are understood to be the "broad and enduring purposes" for which the Services were established by Congressional law. Missions are the tasks assigned by the National Command Authority (NCA) to the combatant commanders. Functions are the specific responsibilities assigned by the NCA to enable the Services to fulfill their legally established roles. A review of these roles and missions is congressionally mandated.

Under the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has specific duties with regard to Service related roles and missions. The Chairman is charged with the following:

Not less than once every three years, or upon the request of the president or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces.²

The last such review was published in May 1995. The report titled, "Directions for Defense, the Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces," offered no recommendations for substantive changes in the operational functions of the Armed Forces. They did, however, recognize examples of "core competencies" that "define the Services or agencies essential contributions." These were:

- Air Force: air superiority; global strike/deep attack; air mobility.
- Army: mobile armored warfare; airborne operations; and light infantry operations.
- Navy: carrier based air amphibious power projection; sea based air and missile defense; antisubmarine warfare.
- Marine Corps: amphibious operations; over the beach forced entry operations; maritime prepositioning.
- Coast Guard: humanitarian operations; maritime defense; safety; law-enforcement; environmental protection.

The introduction of this heretofore-unused category of core competencies may well have been the impetus for the Services to adopt and expand on these in order to both define and solidify for civilian leadership their contributions to national defense.

HISTORY OF CORE COMPETENCIES

Core competency is a business term that found its way into the military's lexicon. The origins of core competencies can be traced back to a work published by business strategist Hiroyuki Itami in 1987 titled *Mobilizing Invisible Assets*. Itami's principal argument was that "the essence of successful strategy lies in . . . *dynamic strategic fit*," the match of external and internal factors and the content of the strategy itself.³ Itami's "invisible assets," such as technological know-how or customer loyalty, equated to a firm's core competencies. Other authors, such as Prahalad and Hamel, have elaborated on Itami's *invisible assets*, calling them the *core competencies* of a firm. To develop this concept the authors draw the allusion of a "competency tree":

The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence (emphasis added). You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at the end products, in the same way you miss the strength of the tree in the look only at its leaves.⁴

They believe that competitive advantage "derives from deeply rooted abilities which lie behind the products that a firm produces." These deeply rooted abilities allow a firm to enter new markets by leveraging what it does best. The hidden (deeply rooted) and not easily imitated competencies are a business's underlying source of strength and success. Accordingly, Prahalad and Hamel contend that the *secret to success is not the product but the unique set of abilities that allow a firm to create great products*.⁵ For them, core competencies are the consequence of the "collective learning of the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technology." As these authors note, a rival might acquire some of the technologies that comprise the core competence, but it will find it more difficult to duplicate the pattern of internal coordination and learning. Others have also developed the notion of core competence.

Mahen Tampoe, in his essay "Exploiting the Core Competence of Your Organization," developed the following extensive checklist to determine whether a competence was really considered "core":

It must be essential to corporate survival in a short and long-term, invisible to competitors, difficult to imitate, unique to the Corporation, a mix of skills, resources and processes, a capability which the organization can sustain overtime, greater than the competence of an individual, essential to the development of core products and eventually to end products, essential to the implementation of the strategic vision of the Corporation, essential to the strategic decisions of the Corporation, marketable and commercially viable, and few in number.⁶

There is much that we can take from this comprehensive list. If correctly identified, core competencies are essential to the strategic vision and strategic decisions for the organization. The work of Tampoe and others provide a basis for understanding the business theory underpinnings of core competencies, but how do these help understand the definitions established by the various Services?

Before examining the core competencies of each of the Services, we must derive our own clear understanding of what constitutes a core competency to use as a baseline for comparison. For our purposes, based on the existing business related definitions and criteria, **core competencies are unique, hard to replicate, and enduring attributes (not products) of the Services whose continued existence provides the source of strength, strategic focus and direction to their institutions.**

Core competencies are *unique* and hard to replicate because knowing the “product” does not divulge the “process.” Core competencies are *enduring* because they transcend the temporal limitations associated with concepts and technology whose obsolescence is defined by the next generation of hardware. These competencies provide *strength, strategic focus, and direction* because, regardless of innovation and external threats, they maintain the organization synchronized with its overarching purpose for being.

SERVICE CORE COMPETENCIES

Our current National Military Strategy (dated 1997) states, "our forces must be proficient in their core competencies and able to transition smoothly from a peacetime posture to swift execution of multiple missions across the full spectrum of operation." With a clear mandate for each Service to remain proficient at its core competencies, there exists a logical expectation that each Service have clearly articulated, commonly defined core competencies. This is not the case. We will examine each of the Services in turn, looking first at their legislated roles and missions, and then the Services' articulation of their core competencies.

We begin with the Air Force because, as the youngest Service and the first to produce a post-Cold War vision, they have done the best job staking out their core competencies. DOD Directive 5100.1 (dated 25 Sept 87) states that the first of the primary functions of the Air Force is the following:

To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air -- specifically, forces to defend the United States against air attack in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS, gain and maintain general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air superiority except as otherwise assigned herein.⁷

Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force chief of staff, addressed core competencies at an Air Force association symposium conducted in Los Angeles in 1996. General Fogleman discussed the adjustments to Air Force core competencies and enumerated the following:

- Air and space superiority
- Global attack
- Rapid global mobility
- Precision engagement
- Information superiority
- Agile combat generation

In this unveiling of the Air Force core competencies as would later be found in Air Force Doctrine Document 1(September 1997), the Air Force chose to add a core competency -- global attack. This was a calculated effort on the Air Force's part to ensure that their Service would be considered expeditionary in nature. As Gen. Fogleman told his audience, "The primary aspect of global attack is the ability to find an attack target anywhere on the globe using the synergy generated by air and space assets to operate at the strategic level of war."⁸ The second major aspect of this core competency was the *expeditionary* nature of the Air Force. This was leveraged from the 1995 Roles and Mission Commission Report that said, "Overseas presence is a core competency of all the Services." This finding softened the Navy's claim that aircraft carrier air was the instrument U.S. presence abroad. The Air Force has also been the most successful at linking their Core Competencies to weapons platforms. They provide a direct lift from the general core competencies, through the capabilities those competencies enable, to the specific aircraft that provide those capabilities, providing a clear picture of "what you get for your money."

The Marine Corps have also been very aggressive in their articulation of core competencies as they support U.S. National Strategy. Marine Corps' *Concept and Issues '98* states, "The U.S. military's overall strength as a fighting force is ultimately a function of Service competencies—reflecting distinct capabilities, cultures, and traditions." For the Marines, core competencies are the following:

- Expeditionary Readiness
- Expeditionary Operations
- Forced Entry From the Sea
- Sea Based Operations
- Reserve Integration

The Marines focus on their traditionally accepted role as an *expeditionary* force. With their long history as an expeditionary force, their appeal is that they are not in the midst of transformation to ensure relevance, but rather *reaffirmation* to ensure viability.

The Army is a relative newcomer to the business of Core Competencies. Core Competencies, as found in the latest draft of Army doctrine FM 1, *The Army*, are defined as "the essential and enduring capabilities of our Service. While they are not necessarily unique to the Army, they define our fundamental contributions to our Nation's security."⁹ There are seven Core Competencies, with one having five supporting competencies. They are as follows:

- Sustained Land Dominance
 - Precision Fires and Maneuver
 - Information Superiority
 - Command and Control of Joint and Multinational Forces
 - Control and Defend Land, People, and Natural Resources
 - Conduct Sustainment Operations
- Prompt Response
- Forcible Entry Operations
- Close With and Destroy Enemy Forces
- Mobilize the Army
- Shape the Security Environment
- Support Civil Authorities

FM 1 also states that core competencies "enable Army forces to carry out any mission, anytime, anywhere in the world,"¹⁰ but makes the distinction that "quality people" turn competencies into capabilities. To further confuse the precise intent for selecting core competencies, the latest

draft of FM 3-0, *Operations*, states that the Army's mission essential tasks are the "operational expression" of the Army's core competencies,¹¹ and posits that they are actually one in the same. If we examine each of these core competencies using the definitional construct provided earlier, we propose that core competencies are the attributes that span the gap between the nature and conduct of war.

THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF WAR

It is important to draw the distinction between the nature and conduct of war. If the nature of 21st century warfare is essentially unchanged from warfare throughout recorded history, then there are certain constants that we would expect to observe. First is the Clausewitzian notion that war is a continuation of politics by other means. We would still expect that states would engage in war because of defined political objectives. Second, war will continue to be characterized by uncertainty and risk, made even more difficult to discern when combating a wily foe. Third, we prosecute war to achieve conclusive results. Lastly, war will remain in the physical domain of personal and oftentimes brutal destruction.¹² Conversely, the conduct of war will continue to evolve with the introduction of new concepts, technologies, and capabilities. It is the judicious selection and complementary application of these technologies and capabilities will be our greatest challenge throughout Army Transformation.

If the nature of war has not changed, then the Army must leverage core competencies as "way points" to help it navigate the uncharted waters of technological innovation and information operations. The Army must jealously guard its core competencies from the one source that could cause deviation from them—*itself*. The Army must ensure that what defines its unique contribution to the nation remains viable even in the most turbulent of times. Core competencies are the attributes that span the gap between the nature and conduct of war. Core competencies are not predictive in nature nor can they be easily duplicated once they are identified. Potential adversaries may "go to school" on how it is that the United States conducts warfare, but knowledge of our core competencies has little intrinsic value to potential adversaries. Their value is in their application by the Service they represent. If the distilled essence of the Army is its core competencies, then these can serve as a "sanity check" to ensure we do not stray away from that which must never be compromised. The Army core competencies are a "hedge" on whatever risk it assumes as new techniques and technologies are integrated. Even when the Army gets a particular direction in innovation wrong, its core competencies will ensure it can respond quickly to the necessary course corrections.

THE ARMY'S INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CORE COMPETENCIES

Title 10, DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, and “Joint Vision 2020” mandate roles, missions, and functions for the Services. The Army defines its own Service core competencies. The Army’s draft core competencies are generalized statements describing the congressionally mandated roles and missions and the DOD assigned functions. These *do not* provide the Services with the source for their core competencies. Core competencies should not be a reiteration or refinement of Service roles, missions, or functions.

The Army, unlike most of civilian organizations, must combine operational experience with institutionally sponsored schooling for the continued education of its leaders. Our officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are “grown” through the combination of experiential maturation (on-the-job-training) and a selection process for schooling to prepare for future assignments of increasing responsibility. There is no opportunity for lateral integration of leadership external to the Army—you must have come up through the ranks. Regardless of technological innovations, a leader’s “judgment, creativity, and adaptability in the face of highly dynamic situations will be essential to the success of future joint operations.”¹³ Thus, **the development of adaptive, mentally agile leaders is an Army core competency.** The Army develops leaders through a combination of unit level mentorship, leader training at the Combined Arms Training Centers (CTCs), and the military education system. This leadership training is an *institutional* Army core competency. It is these leadership attributes, imprinted on Army leaders, and not the leaders themselves, that indicate the existence of a core competency. But does leader development through the military education system meet the definition of core competencies?

We must examine leader development using the various elements of our definition of core competencies. First, is leader development unique and hard to replicate? Perhaps, at first blush, it is not. After all, we are talking about leadership training, something that is part of virtually every professional military in the world. However, on reflection, it is not the existence of the training as much as it is the quality and depth of its institutionalization that makes the difference. Our NCOs, in particular, are the envy of most armies because of their ability to act independently of officer supervision. They do what most armies require of their junior commissioned officers. There exists a well-established and rigorous process of bringing officers and NCOs back to school based on the merit of their operational performance and

demonstrated potential for future responsibility. Many visiting military dignitaries have seen first hand how our professional military education system works. Even with a thorough understanding of the program of instruction (POI) and the screening requirements for students, other militaries cannot easily replicate our military education system. Again, you cannot copy the product simply by identifying its constituent parts. The “secret ingredient” in our military education system is the soldier, as much a product of the American society as of the Army that trains him or her. The “institutional Army” is not referring to a specific unit or icon, but the military education system that is both the caretaker and the continuity for the standards and traditions of the Service. Paradoxically, it is also the institutional vehicle for generating change.

The Army can generate irreversible momentum for its transformation by using the military education system to produce leaders that know how to think, not what to think. We can make, with some trepidation, the analogy to the business sector. A profit-oriented business grows and remains viable by reapplying and reconfiguring whatever it does best. It can never “rest on its laurels,” lest the competition gain the initiative because of the market leaders inactively. The secret to success is not the great product but the unique set of abilities that allow the creation of the product. While not a profit oriented business, it is the unique set of abilities resident in the military education system that allow for the development and continued growth of Army leaders. These same leaders are the *source of strength, strategic focus and direction for the Army*—further validating the military education system as a core competency.

The ability to produce leaders with the requisite attributes to lead the Army into the 21st century is not, by itself, the defining aspect of what the Army is and its reason for being. If we agree that the products of the military education system are one of the Army’s “invisible assets,” then we have only half of what is required, or “the sound of one hand clapping,” if that leadership is not adequately focused to meet the requirements of Congressional legislation and Department of Defense directives. The Army’s second core competency is operational in nature—the necessary compliment to its institutional core competency—to **close with and destroy the enemy**. When called upon, this competency is the active means by which the Army has defended our nation for over 200 years.

As one of the seven proposed Army core competencies, FM 1 (Draft) states, “The ability to close with and destroy the enemy forces, occupy his territory, and control his population removes his will to resist. To close with and destroy the enemy is the ability to terminate conflict on our terms.”¹⁴ But is close combat necessary?

The nature of warfare and the essence of land combat have not changed with the beginning of a new millennium. Carl von Clausewitz, in his enduring description of war in the

18th century said, "Kind-hearted people might think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine that this is the true goal of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst."¹⁵ When called upon, the Army must still be prepared to close with and destroy the enemy even as information age precision technology offers the allure of long-range "surgical" engagements. For those looking for the means to avoid the brutal reality of close combat there is the illusory hope that somehow, even after armed conflict occurs, the enemy will capitulate because of a well orchestrated precision munitions strike. Can we say that the judicious use of technological superiority alone will cause the enemy to capitulate? Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege writes:

The enemy quits not because of what has already happened, but because of what he believes might happen if he does not. Fires, whether stand off or close are transient. They have great moral influence, but only for the duration of their existence. Extended range fires can set the terms of close combat, but the enemy quits because he fears the inevitability of defeat. There is no sure way to demonstrate that inevitability than with an overwhelming and imminent threat on the ground. Ground combat veterans and military historians generally agree that instances of defenses to the last man are rare, and attacks to the last man are even more rare. The psychological breaking point is reached as soon as the inevitability of continued resistance is clear.¹⁶

BG (R) Wass de Czege's point is central to understanding the need to maintain proficiency in the one capability the Army cannot quickly regenerate if we find that we are unable to take the fight to the enemy. Emerging doctrine has closing with and destroying the enemy as *one of* our Army's core competencies when, in fact, it is the overarching competency under which all of the others are subsumed. Destruction of enemy forces is certainly not always applicable (or required) across the spectrum of conflict, but it is the one capability that we must never allow to atrophy. Because of our ability to grow and train adaptive leaders (our other core competency), the Army can perform virtually any mission assigned. Let us examine each of the other proposed core competencies in turn.

Shape the security environment is descriptive of a key element of our current national security strategy of shape, respond, and prepare. The FM 1 articulation of this competency refers to "providing presence—boots on the ground" to "deter conflict, reassure allies, promote regional stability, encourage democratic institutions, and respond to crises."¹⁷ While certainly an important element of our regional Commander in Chiefs' (CINCs) Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), military presence, regardless of its purpose, is not *per se* a core competency but rather a

basic requirement for the prevention of hostile escalation or the first step in any follow on actions that must be taken.

The core competencies *mobilize the Army, prompt response, and sustained land combat dominance* are directly derived from the primary functions of the Army as found in the DOD Directive 5100.1.¹⁸ As such, these DOD directed functions, albeit important because of their intrinsic contribution to closing with and destroying the enemy, do not meet the definitional requirements of a Service core competency as proposed above. We would argue that these directed functions, necessarily specified by DOD to ensure emphasis and compliance, are subordinate to the Army's singular operational core competency—the enduring attribute of closing with and destroying the enemy.

Forcible entry operations, while not stipulated in a DOD directive,¹⁹ are a logical requirement for an Army that must project its force, with the aid of the Air Force and Navy, for employment. Again, the inherent utility of this core competency is undercut by the fact that forcible entry operations are a necessary prerequisite for the eventual close fight that the Army must be prepared to conduct. As with the other proposed core competencies, it is an important but subordinate consideration to what the Army must always be capable of executing—taking the fight to the enemy and destroying him.

Supporting civil authority is a basic, indisputable tenant for all U.S. armed forces. It is the “catch-all” requirement that, within the limits of *posse comitatus*, has the active Army ready to support civilian authority wherever and whenever necessary. The Army enjoys a special relationship with the American people when it comes to its integrated support with the Reserve and National Guard. These citizen soldiers are a visible reminder to all Americans that the Army is always ready to provide prompt assistance when called upon for support. As with the other proposed competencies, this is an inherent function of the Army rather than a core competency.

CORE COMPETENCIES AND ARMY TRANSFORMATION: THE LINKAGE

The Army's mission, according to its Transformation Campaign Plan, is to transform itself “into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at **every point** on the spectrum of operations (emphasis added).”²⁰ That is a “tall order” for the United States Army. If the United States military is the most studied force in the world,²¹ then what is it that will keep us from becoming victims of our own success? It was strategic defense expert Edward Luttwak who best summed up the paradoxical logic of a successful military endeavor when he said, “The

reason that something might not work the next time is precisely because it worked the last time.”²² The Army rightly assesses its greatest challenge as follows:

Overall, potential adversaries are basing their investments in military technologies on their perceptions of how the US has historically operated. Those who believe themselves to be threatened by the US are developing adaptive strategies, tactics, and force designs suitable to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and counter or mitigate US strengths.²³

The good news is that the Army realizes the importance of this unprecedented period²⁴ in our history. Our nation finds itself at the temporal confluence of global leadership, uncertain peace and ill-defined but ubiquitous threats. This is the time to transform the Army so that it will not have it “too wrong”²⁵ when called upon by our nation’s leaders. If properly identified, nurtured, and inculcated, the Army’s core competencies will provide strategic focus and direction throughout this turbulent period of transformation.

The institutional development of adaptive, mentally agile leaders, coupled with an operational focus on closing with and destroying the enemy, will ensure that transformation maintains the necessary strategic focus and direction. Legacy, Interim, and Objective forces are bound together by these two core competencies. If “people are the centerpiece of our formations, and leadership is our stock in trade,”²⁶ then the linkage between Army leaders and their readiness to execute their most difficult task (enemy destruction) remains paramount throughout transformation.

CONCLUSIONS

Core competencies provide the one true vector that Army transformation must follow. Today, the Army attempts to hedge future uncertainty with a viable transformation plan as a road map for strategic direction. It is incumbent on the Army leadership to clearly articulate the core competencies to both its soldiers and our nation’s leaders. Unfortunately, this mandate lacks a clear definition of core competencies. As we have seen, FM 1, The Army (Prototype Draft), defines core competencies as “essential and enduring capabilities” that “define our fundamental contributions “ to the national security.²⁷ A better definition, based on the business origins of the term and vetted in the practical requirements of the military Services, is **unique, hard to replicate, and enduring attributes (not products) of the Services whose continued existence provides the source of strength, strategic focus and direction to their institutions.** Given this definition, two Army core competencies emerge.

The Army has not correctly identified its core competencies to respond to the national military strategy. The Army should adopt and maintain as its core competencies the developing of **adaptive, mentally agile leaders and closing with and destroying the enemy**. These two competencies encapsulate the two principle lines of continuity, institutional and operational. When synthesized down to the essence of the Army's "reason for being," it continues to be about training leaders who are capable of leading soldiers into close combat to destroy the enemy. The inclusion of other proposed core competencies only dilutes the strategic focus and direction we seek to achieve. The Army enters the 21st century with a clear mandate to transform itself to meet the challenging requirements and global responsibilities our nation imposes. The Army must maintain the flexibility to conduct operations along the entire spectrum of conflict, but it can never waiver from its commitment to protect and inculcate these vital competencies. It must either nurture and develop its core competencies or suffer the ignominious fate of having failed the nation and its soldiers when called to duty. Amidst the promise of today's opportunities and the uncertainty of tomorrow's threat is found the Army's sacred trust—to fight and win our nation's wars.

WORD COUNT= 5034

ENDNOTES

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 February 1995); I-6.

² Goldwater-Nichols Act 1986, U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5, Sec. 153 (b) (1), (accessed 26 January 2001); available from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/title_10.html; internet

³ Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, *Strategy Safari* (New York: Free Press, 1998), 217

⁴ *Ibid.*, 217.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 218

⁶ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁷ Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.1, September 25, 1987, Subject: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, 24.

⁸ Gen Ronald R. Fogelman, Prepared remarks at the Air Force Association Symposium, Los Angeles (October 18, 1996)

⁹ Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1 (Prototype Draft), Version K (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2000), 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹¹ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 1 October 2000), 1-4.

¹² Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, *The Foundations of Army Transformation and the Objective Force Concept* (Ft Monroe, Virginia: Training and Doctrine Command, 17 January, 2001 Final Draft); p 4.

¹³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Concept for Joint Future Operations* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1997); p 17.

¹⁴ Field Manual 1 (Prototype Draft), 18.

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. And ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75.

¹⁶ Huba Wass de Czege, "Closing with the Enemy: The Core Competency of an Army," *Military Review*, (May-June 2000): 8.

¹⁷ Field Manual 1 (Prototype Draft), 19.

¹⁸ Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.1, 17-18.

¹⁹ DOD Directive 5100.1, p 18, alludes to "provide forces for the occupation of territory abroad"

²⁰ United States Army Transformation Plan, 4.

²¹ *ibid.*, 2.

²² Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987), quoted in Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: University Press, 1999), 42.

²³ United States Army Transformation Plan, 7.

²⁴ There is a good argument for comparing this period to the turn of the last century. The army found itself an expeditionary force focused primarily on small scale contingencies. See LTC Gray's SRP Titled, *New Age Military Progressives: U.S. Army Officer Professionalism in the Information Age*.

²⁵ Paraphrasing Sir Michael Howard's quote in reference to doctrine

²⁶ United States Army Transformation Plan, 4.

²⁷ Field Manual 1 (Prototype Draft), 16.

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